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Accession No. *GR-271...**A-52362*
MAR 16 1945Date Rec'd SA *25 Feb 1945*

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SECRET

REMINGTON RAND INC., BRIDGEPORT CONN., REM-MASTER 251-1

25 JANUARY 1969

**Hq 267th Regiment
Davydovskiy "R"**

68-272

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

COUNTRY
SUBJECT

Additional review, covering period 20
January-21 February

ORIGINAL REPORT NO.

05-272

**DATE OF REPORT
EVALUATION**

25 February 1945

[illegible]

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3. Discussion

1. THE SOURCE

DATE OF INFORMATION 28 January-31 February 1945

NUMBER OF PAGES: 1

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PLACE OF ORIGIN

Discussion

ATTACHMENT 2

THEATRE

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COMMUNICATIONS

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The following review of political events in Rumania was prepared by a well-informed editor of a large independent Bucharest daily:

~~Summary: The analysis and interpretations con-
tained in the following report do not in all
cases support the position of this organiza-
tion. In several instances the author appears
to accept the actions and statements of the
National Democratic Front too readily. Also,
the explanation of the fall of the Samakone
government appears untenable. However, the
overall presentation of the various elements
which have combined to produce the present
crisis is considered to be of value. The
report also contains certain new items of
information which have not been reported pre-
viously.~~

2. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Comment: For text of FND program, see CR-197A-49297
of 29 January.

The ~~fraternal~~ ^{relationship} between the governing political parties was broken on 29 January. On that day the National Democratic Front brought out a manifesto entitled "Government Program". In this manifesto the NDF stated that its program would be if it should be called to govern alone. The program contains the following 9 points:

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25 February 1945

Hq 257th Regiment
Detachment "R"

GR-271

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

COUNTRY: Rumania
SUBJECT: Political review, covering period 28 January-21 February

ORIGINAL REPORT NO. GR-271
DATE OF REPORT 25 February 1945
EVALUATION C-3

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The following review of political events in Rumania was prepared by a well-informed editor of a large independent Bucharest daily:

Comment: The analysis and interpretations contained in the following report do not in all cases represent the position of this organization. In several instances the author appears to accept the actions and statements of the National Democratic Front too readily. Also, the explanation of the fall of the Scutariu government appears untenable. However, the overall presentation of the various elements which have combined to produce the present crisis is considered to be of value. The report also contains certain new items of information which have not been reported previously.

1. Announcement of EMD government program

Comment: For text of EMD program, see GR-197 of 29 January.

The truce between the governing political parties was broken on 26 January. On that day the National Democratic Front brought out a manifesto entitled "Government Program". In this manifesto the EMD stated what its program would be if it should be called to govern alone. The program contains the following 9 points:

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- 1) A maximum effort of participation in the war at the side of the United Nations.
- 2) The rigorous and complete fulfillment of the conditions of the Armistice Convention.
- 3) The establishment of sincere and lasting friendship with all democratic countries, and especially with the U.S. S.R.
- 4) The creation of a democratic and brotherly policy between the various nationalities living in the country.
- 5) The establishment of regular commercial exchanges with all democratic countries, and especially with the U.S.S.R. and neighboring countries.
- 6) Agrarian reform by the confiscation of lands which exceed 50 hectares.
- 7) The removal of fascist and sabotaging elements from the head of public and private enterprises.
- 8) The raising of the economic level, and also the cultural and sanitary level of the workers, and all state and private employees.
- 9) The reorganization of the army in the democratic spirit, and the assurance of the speedy return of prisoners of war in Russia.
- 10) The arrest and trial of war criminals, the liquidation of the legionary movement, and the cleansing of the State apparatus of fascist and pro-fascist elements.

For the realization of the goals set forth in this program, the FPD called on "all sincere patriots, and all political and professional groups to adhere to the Government program and to enroll in its ranks."

This breaking of the political armistice occurred, when the Government presided over by General Radescu had been in office less than 2 months.

2. Basis of conflict between FPD and historical parties

The breaking of the Armistice on the part of the FPD had no apparently profound reasons. Public opinion was therefore puzzled. The truth is that the FPD having worked for a period of three months with the so-called "historical" parties, came to the conclusion that these parties were animated by a reactionary spirit, which spirit was apparent whenever a decision for reform, socially or in internal economy, had to be taken.

Comment: This conclusion over-simplifies the issue. There is evidence that the Communist Party, at least, has been preoccupied from the beginning with the problem of achieving political power.

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The profound difference in views between the historical parties and the FND was made obvious especially when there was talk of making a law to annul the sales made under threats from 1940-1944. This is in regard to the sales made by the Jews under legionary terror or under the fear of having their possessions confiscated.

The profound differences in opinions in this respect was also noticeable three months later when the Minister of Justice Lucretiu Patrascoiu brought up for discussion at the Ministers' Council the law for the restitution of Jewish property. As is known, this law was responsible for the overthrow of the Sanatescu Government. The law for the annulment of all sales made under threats gave rise to misunderstandings between the representatives of the two groups. On the one hand, the F.N.L. gave the appearance of wanting to repair the injustice done to the Jews under the legionary and Dictatorship regimes, while on the other hand, the representatives of the historical parties, without having the courage to pronounce categorically against the law, tried in every way to delay the perfecting of the law. Then, when the project had got to the final stages, a crisis in the Government was asked for and took place. Any attentive investigator cannot but come to the conclusion that this crisis was wanted and promoted by the historical parties.

Comment: The evidence collected at the time of the fall of the Sanatescu government clearly indicates that the change in government, in the developing conflict between the historical parties and the newly-found left-wing forces. Therefore, it appears completely erroneous to delimit the cause of the fall of the Sanatescu government to the above-mentioned legislation.

3. General Radescu's speech at the "Aro" and FND reaction

The meeting at the "Aro" which was General Radescu's first attack against the FND was made under pressure of the historical parties, who declared to the Prime Minister, that if he did not adopt an attitude as regards the agrarian problem, those parties would withdraw their representatives from the Government. (It is worthy of note that until the meeting at the Aro, collaboration between the FND and the Prime Minister was as satisfactory as it could be.)

At the "Aro", General Radescu spoke to a hall filled with representatives of the historical parties, and with reactionary students. General Radescu opened fire on the FND by attacking the latter's policy with severity and even aggressively. After the meeting, a brawl took place in front of the Royal palace between the FND and the representatives of the historical parties. It is true that the next day, General Radescu, probably realizing that he had gone too far with his declarations, tried to soften their effect by making another speech, this time at the radio. But the glove had been taken by the FND. The crisis had been launched.

Comment: For account of Radescu's speech at the "Aro" see CR-230 of 12 February.

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The reply of the FND to General Radescu's declarations was the street demonstration which took place on Tuesday, 13 February. This should have taken place the day before but was postponed because General Radescu had informed the FND that he forbade any street demonstrations.

As was seen, the demonstration still took place, under the slogans "Down with Radite", "We want a FND Government", "Death to Fascists and Legionnaires". Although over 200,000 workers took part in the demonstration, no incident took place. It was also remarked that there were no cries of "Down with Radescu", but only for the removal of reactionary elements from the Government.

Comment: Estimates of attendance at the demonstration, by American observers, ranged from 25,000 to 100,000. The Communist press claimed that 500,000 attended, obviously a gross exaggeration.

This may mean that at that time the FND did not think of breaking off relations with General Radescu, but that in accordance with a former plan, General Radescu had to be treated with consideration to preside as Prime Minister over an FND Government.

4. General Vinogradov's position

Being apprised of what was going on at Bucharest, General Vinogradov who was attending a military conference at Simla, came to Bucharest and called General Radescu and the representatives of the FND for an audience at the same time. General Vinogradov spoke very severely about what had been happening. He addressed himself very violently both to the Prime Minister and to the FND representatives, telling them to leave their quarrels and work as hard as possible for the fulfillment of the Armistice conditions. After the departure of the FND delegation, General Radescu remained two hours in conference with General Vinogradov. General Radescu told source that he had sincerely explained his point of view to General Vinogradov, and that he guaranteed that production affecting Soviet Russia, might be increased if General Vinogradov would undertake to show the FND clearly that they could not count unreservedly on U.S.S.R. support. General Radescu left with the conviction that General Vinogradov would do what he had asked.

On this conviction all later actions of General Radescu are based, actions which show the firm decision of the Prime Minister not to give in at any price to the demands of the FND.

5. Dispute between Radescu and Teohari Georgescu

In the days following, a letter was written by Minister Teohari Georgescu, in which the latter denounced General Radescu to the public as having prevented the cleaning up process at the Ministry of the Interior. Mr. Teohari Georgescu's letter was read at the sitting of the Council of Ministers and produced an even greater sense of strain among those present. General Radescu, supported by the historical parties, asked the FND to declare if they were or were not in favor of the attitude of Minister Teohari Georgescu.

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This demand, with the character of an ultimatum, gave rise to lively discussions in the bosom of the FND council - where as will be seen later there are two camps, which differ profoundly as to their views of the political crisis and the attitude to be adopted in the present circumstances.

On interventions made to General Radescu, the latter was prevailed upon to lengthen the term given.

Comment: For information regarding the later dismissal of Georgescu and his defiance of the order, see GR-264 of 23 February.

6. Effects of Yalta Conference

Meanwhile, the communique containing the resolutions at Yalta appeared. These declarations contain, as is known, definite provisions relating to the government of former Axis vassals. It is said, for example, that these states (in which category Rumania belongs), cannot be governed by a single party, but by all the democratic currents. It is also stated that these States, cannot ask for the help of one of the three Great Powers, but that all three powers undertake to guarantee order if this is endangered.

These decisions of such importance to Rumania, have found a deep echo in Rumanian public opinion, which had resigned itself somehow to the idea that the Anglo-Americans would never play a role in the internal policy of Rumania. Even more, it was thought that Rumania was definitely given over to the Russian sphere of influence, from which conclusion sprang the idea that internally the country would be at the discretion of the FND.

Comment: For communist reaction to Yalta conference, see GR-235 of 14 February.

7. Further developments of the crisis

Immediately following the declarations at Yalta, Mr. Iuliu Maniu returned to the Capital from Sibiu, where he had been obliged to take a rest. The return of Mr. Maniu to Bucharest strengthened still more the position of General Radescu, and the attitude of the historical parties toward the FND.

On Sunday, 18 February, the FND installed communist mayors at T. Margurele and at Craiova. By General Radescu's orders, the army used force, arrested the appointed mayors, and replaced them with those chosen by the Ministry of the Interior. Incidents happened, which served to strain the relations between the Prime Minister and the FND even more.

It is to be remarked, however, that the FND which had the way for the resignation of their ministers, did not take advantage of it. Neither did General Radescu resign. On the contrary, he announced on Tuesday 20 February

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to his friends that he had not the slightest intention of resigning, and that he was decided to use all means, even the extreme one of bringing out the army on the streets, to combat the communists.

If, however, the FND ministers, did not go what would have been normal on finding themselves in disagreement with the rest of the Government and with the Prime Minister, this was because they had information that such a Government crisis would not terminate in favor of the FND.

3: Attitude of the Palace

Mr. Negel, the Marshal of the Palace, on Monday afternoon, 19 February, stated that the King wished to maintain his position on a constitutional basis. The King regretted that Rumania has no constituted parliament, so that he might follow the indications of universal voting as regards changes in the government. Mr. Negel let it be understood that the King must realize the real balance in strength between the parties facing each other, a balance which is not favorable to the Communist party.

Palace sentiments regarding an FND government are known to Communist leaders. They know that in the event of a crisis, the FND will not have the chance to form its own government. That is why FND ministers do not resign from the government (where they hold half the total number of votes). At the same time they are doing everything to prepare for a launching of a crisis, before the decisions of the Yalta Conference produce any effect on the state of affairs in Rumania.

9. The Malaxa incident

The incidents which took place on Tuesday, 20 February, at the Malaxa plants, also constitute a motive for the breaking up of the present government. The FND gives the impression that they are counting on intervention from Soviet Russia, and effective help in solving the Government crisis in favor of the FND.

At Malaxa, as in many other factories, reactionary elements have come to the forefront. They now work openly, when in accordance with the provisions of the new syndical laws, elections take place in all factories. The results of these elections have in most cases been unfavorable to the Communist party. Thus at the Monitorul Oficial printing plant, where the Official State Gazette is printed, the communists obtained only 25% of the votes. The same thing threatened to happen at Malaxa, on Monday afternoon, 19 February, when the elections took place. Consequently, the communists attempted to prevent the holding of elections. A row took place and the elections were postponed for Tuesday morning, when they took place in the presence of an attorney at law. At a certain moment, the general director of the factory, who is a Communist, was congested in a room. He succeeded in escaping in two hours, and called all the workers syndicates to help him. During the uproar, worker Apostol, the President of the General Labor Confederation in Rumania, was shot in the abdomen. His condition is serious.

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Comments: This interpretation of the Malara incident is probably too favorable to the FND. For a fuller account of the incident see GR-265 of 23 February.

9. FND attack now directed against Radescu

Following the events of the last few days, the Communist party has composed yet another slogan, this time concerning General Radescu himself. In accordance with this new slogan, beginning with Tuesday morning, the workers ask for the removal of General Radescu. Numerous placards to this effect are on the streets and street cars.

But as mentioned above, General Radescu has not the slightest idea of resigning. He is using stronger and still stronger methods against the Communists. Thus, on Tuesday, 20 February, he dismissed the Communist Teohari Georgescu from the Ministry of the Interior, where he was in office as an under Secretary of State. To do this, he modified the organization law of the Ministry of the Interior, by abolishing the posts of Under-Secretaries of State. By this means, Mr. Teohari Georgescu was dismissed indirectly. The decision for the abolishing of the Under Secretaryships of State, appeared on Tuesday in the Monitorul Oficial (Official Gazette). (In accordance with Rumanian law, a decree must be published in the Official Gazette to have force of law). At first the working printers refused to publish this decree. (As is known, Mr. Teohari Georgescu is himself a working printer at the Monitorul Oficial.) On 20 February the workers went back on their decision and printed the text of the decision.

As a point of curiosity, it may be mentioned that the decision for the abolishing of the Under-Secretaryships of State also bears the signature of Mr. Petre Gresa, leading light of the FND. He excuses himself on the grounds that he did not realize the sense of the decision when he appended his signature.

With the abolition of the post of Mr. Teohari Georgescu, the Communist Party and the FND consider themselves directly challenged by General Radescu. On Tuesday, 20 February, in the afternoon, the Communist party held a political meeting in which they examined the situation. A series of strong measures were discussed for the ousting of the present Government. At the same time it was decided to appeal for the intervention of the Soviet Control Commission.

10. The FND and the Crimea Conference

The FND Council made a declaration regarding its point of view on the Crimea Conference. The council considers that the declaration from the Crimea in reference to Rumania, is "a crushing blow to the policy of the reactionary leaders of the two historical parties, as well as a crushing blow to the reactionary policy of Prime Minister Radescu".

The declaration further shows that a solution by democratic methods of problems in Rumania can only be brought about by an FND government, because only such a government can satisfy the decisions taken at Yalta, namely, the forming of a government "which would represent generally, all democratic elements of the population".

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11. Mr. Maniu's declarations

Being apprised of the declarations of the FND regarding the Crises Conference, Mr. Maniu made a declaration to the press on Monday evening, 19 February. These declarations could not appear in the press, because the working printers refused to print them.

In these declarations Mr. Maniu used a very violent tone against the FND which he accused of sabotaging the elections, sabotaging the agrarian reforms, and of encouraging anarchy. He further accused the FND of wanting to install a proletarian dictatorship.

Mr. Maniu said too, that the National Peasant Party is the determined partisan of individual property. In conclusion, Mr. Maniu asked for the rounding up and punishment of those guilty of the war, the following of a policy which will assure the liberty and independence of Rumania, and emphasized the necessity of continuing the war beside the great allies until the final victory against Germany.

The declarations of Mr. Maniu are of great importance to public opinion, because they constitute the taking up of a determined position against the FND. Owing to the calm temperament of Mr. Maniu, these categorical and violent declarations make it clear that no understanding is possible between him and the FND.

It should be emphasized that between him and the FND no further collaboration is possible. However, the National Peasant Party might follow another road than that being traced out now by Maniu. The peasant branch of the old kingdom in the party, a branch led by Messrs. Mihalache and Dr. Lupu is negotiating with the FND. The result of these negotiations will be known in a few days.

In the case that the peasant branch, which represents the truly democratic wing of the National Peasant Party, should rally to the FND, which is not at all certain at the present moment, it might be that the whole aspect of internal political life would change. Then one could begin to talk of an FND government. When the FND works as it does now against the government, it is with this end in view.

12. The List of War Criminals

Among the events of the last two weeks which ought to find a place in this bulletin, is the publication of the list of war criminals. The publication of this list takes place 6 months after the installation of the democratic regime in Rumania. The list comprises only a few names, and disregards some real war criminals. The publication of this list was produced with great difficulty both because of the reserve of the historical parties regarding some who were on the list, and because of the demand of the historical parties for the inclusion of the name of Mr. Tatarescu.

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The Liberal Party also asked that General Dobro, former Minister of Army Equipment under Antonescu should be handled gently. He was the most germanophile minister, and put all the armament industry at the disposal of the Germans.

The trial of war criminals will probably begin next week. For the moment some of the war criminals, as for instance Keresit, Gligur, Valer Pop and others, enjoy a very tolerant treatment. They have been allowed to go home and await their trial.

13. Agrarian Reform and the Peasants

While the parties are quarreling about the application of the agrarian reform, peasants in many counties have begun to carry out application of the same themselves. Peasants have entered the estates and divided the lands. The historical parties have protested, pointing out that in this way, the road is being prepared for a peasant revolution, similar to other revolutions which took place in Rumania in 1907 on the same question. The historical parties point out that there is much less land available than is necessary for a just division among those who have the right to it. It is also shown that in dividing up the big estates, there is a risk that the land will remain uncultivated, as the peasants do not possess the necessary agricultural machinery.

The disagreement between the historical parties and the FND on this question goes on, while the peasants, as has been said, pass over every obstacle and proceed with the division of the estates as they think fit.

14. The Case of the "Vitorul"

The newspaper Vitorul was suppressed by the Control Commission for the application of the Armistice. During the latter days, Vitorul was in conflict with its working printers, who refused to print certain articles, as for example, those written by Parosanu, the director of the newspaper, who is accused of being reactionary. Following this the management of Vitorul appealed to the army. For two days the workers carried on with the army present, with the threat that if they refused they would be sent to the front. On the third day the workers were dismissed, for refusal to work. The newspaper continued to be printed by student adherents of the Liberal party.

The suppression of the newspaper Vitorul was carried out on the grounds that this newspaper published an article referring to the state of affairs in Moldavia. Speaking about various people in Moldavia, the author instead of revealing their true names, replaced these by initials and by X.Y.Z. The Soviet Control Commission taking this to be cipher, and against the provisions of the Armistice Convention, ordered the newspaper to be suspended. This act gave great satisfaction to the workers.

Comments: For a fuller account of the Vitorul episode, which presents the action of the management in a less critical light, see GR-256 of 21 February.

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15. Attitude of University students

During the last two weeks a revival of the legionary and fascist movement at the Universities has been observed. Encouraged by the mild action of the Courts Martial which condemned medical students who were propagating the idea of racial hatred to sentences of only 6 months imprisonment, (not to mention the sentence of 2 months imprisonment of those who assaulted Mr. Petre Gross), the students are becoming cheeky. At present they are organizing themselves. In the halls of the faculties, inscriptions of a racial character have made their appearance, and because they cannot resort to the old student societies, the students are working out a system by which they are protected by the Church. In all the Faculties, notices have been put up announcing that Christian students are invited to a religious Conference, which will take place at the Church in Strada Polona No. 46. There a priest will speak about the Christian youth in Belgium, Holland and Italy.

Inside the Faculties the students are becoming more and more aggressive towards the Jewish students. However, no serious incidents have yet taken place. On the other hand, demonstrations of sympathy have been made to professors well known for their pro-fascist sympathies. For example, Istrate Nicescu, although excluded from the Ilfov Bar, still maintains his chair at the Law Faculty. Last Friday he opened the Civil Law course, and was acclaimed by the students.

The cleansing operation in the Universities are being carried out slowly, and do not touch all those who by their attitude have shown their pro-fascist views.

16. The case of Savul Radulescu

The Soviet Control Commission came into conflict with the Romanian Commission over the following question: The Patriarch of Romania sent the Moscow Government a letter of thanks for its Christian attitude towards the churches in Moldavia. The letter was handed for transmittal to the Romanian Commission for the application of the Armistice on 25 November. Seeing that three months had passed without any reply having been received, the Patriarch wrote another letter, which he sent this time directly to the Soviet authorities. On inquiries being made, it was discovered that the Moscow Government had not received the letter, whence the protest of the Soviet Commission to Mr. Savul Radulescu. On investigation, it was found that the chief of Mr. Savul Radulescu's cabinet, Trancu, on receiving the Patriarch's letter, had omitted to forward it. This conflict with the Soviet Control Commission is not yet settled. The Russian point of view is that ill will was shown by the refusal to send the letter which might have had the effect of softening Romanian public opinion as regards the crimes and robberies laid at the door of the Soviet Armies.

17. Expropriation of Jewish property

Lastly, another event of a political character which has happened during the last few days is the expropriation of 500 big Jewish properties for the use of the State. This refers to those properties which the State took over from the C.N.R. (Romanian National Committee) during the last few years for its public services. Mostly these are block-houses with many apartments, in which the

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State has installed its departments. The expropriation of these properties, has given rise to great agitation among the Jews, who see in this measure an obvious racial significance.

Following the agitation created by this measure, Mr. Ch. Pop, Minister of Culture has publicly declared that his Ministry renounces the buildings which were given to it from expropriated Jewish property. Dr. Pildorson, President of the Romanian Jews in a written protest to the government asks where the State will find the dozens of milliards necessary to pay for these properties which they are expropriating, when the State refuses even to pay to the Jews the sums of money taken by the C.N.R. as rent for the respective properties of the Jews under the dictatorship.

An appeal in this sense has also been made to the King.